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Abstract 
We want to stress the irreducibility of subjectivity to a pure physical process 
and, related to this the existence of an actual free will. A discussion on the ex-
istence of free will goes back at least to the Middle Ages. Today however the 
problem has been considered again in the framework of Neurophysiology and 
in connection with specific experiments. The problem is related to reduction-
ism, i.e. the claim that subjectivity could be considered an epiphenomenon of 
the cerebral processes, the argument being that all our sensorial perceptions, 
the control of movement, our states of wakefulness or of unconsciousness can 
be related to the activation or to the block of specific areas of our cerebral 
cortex. In the frame of this conception free will is denied essentially on the ba-
sis of physical determinism. In contrast to such attitude, we argue that expe-
riences like consciousness of ourselves, of a personal identity or even simply 
of qualia completely escape from concepts of physical nature. As a conse-
quence of the specific epistemological choice, they cannot even be expressed 
in the language of Physics. The point of view of Physics and introspection ap-
pear both essential but complementary and irreducible one to the other; any 
attempt to do so brings to unresolvable aporias. Specifically on free will, we 
note that our nervous system is a complex mesoscopic system, for an under-
standing of its occurrences, reference to Quantum Theory is essential. As 
consequence, its reaction to any external input is not uniquely determined but 
is open to a plurality of responses for which only a distribution of probability 
is given. Physics does not provide any cause for one response rather than 
another, while we experience our response to be intentional. Quantum Me-
chanics seems to offer the logical space to reconcile Physics with introspec-
tion. Some basic notions on the structure and working of neurons and of the 
central nervous systems are also recalled, Liebet’s experiments on retarded 
awareness and the role of free will in the knowledge process are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
I am sitting at my desk and decide to write to a friend, I feel myself free to move 
an object from here to there and then from there to another place. I dwell on the 
memory of some nice experience I have lived in the past, I call to my mind the 
image of some place I have visited during last holidays and which I was particu-
larly impressed by. Since I was a baby, as I grew up, I developed an ever clearer 
awareness of a world which is something different from me, which I can act on, 
but I cannot dispose of at my will, an awareness of myself experiencing it and of 
a limited freedom I have, even if under various conditionings. 
Free Will is the term used to express the ability of man to make free decision 
and a discussion on Free Will goes back at least to Middle Ages, but until recent 
times it was in the framework of Philosophy, Psychology and Theology. It is 
clear that the problem is strictly connected to the possibility of Ethics and to the 
recognition of our responsibility for our actions. The recognition of such free-
dom is implicit in the existence itself of a set of rules which we are required to 
conform to in any human society, in the existence of a more or less structured 
penal law and in the exceptions that are acknowledged in case of serious mental 
upsets. 
Today, however, the problem of freedom of will has been questioned again on 
the basis of our present knowledge of Neurophysiology and the results of specific 
experiments. There are scientists who maintain that freedom of will is an illu-
sion. Obviously this is in the context of reductionist conceptions, in the belief 
that our subjectivity itself could be led back only to an understanding of the 
structure of our brain and of the physical processes that occur in it. So, with ref-
erence to the problem of free will, it must consider the preliminary problem 
whether it is really possible to reduce our awareness, consciousness of ourselves, 
our personal identity, simply to a physical problem. 
The problem of reductionism or that of the irreducibility of our inner expe-
rience is naturally strictly connected with general philosophical conceptions, to-
day however it deserves a reconsideration in the light of our present scientific 
knowledge. From this point of view reductionism rests on two different orders of 
arguments: 
a) The possibility to relate our sensorial perceptions, the control of our 
movements, our activity of thought, our state of wakefulness or of unconscious-
ness, to the existence and the activation of specific areas of our brain cortex. This 
can be obtained by considering the effects of specific injuries to our brain or by a 
direct measurement of its electric activity or blood fluxes by means of our 
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present instrumentation. 
b) A certain analogy with artificial intelligence models. Under various aspects, 
in fact, our brain can be assimilated to a computer, with its operative system, 
with working and storage memories. Actually, computers are organized accord-
ing to a serial plan, while our brain has a net structure, but this may be seen as a 
complication rather than an essential difference and there are attempts of a ma-
thematical theory of neural nets. People maintain that our mind could be led 
back to a purely physical event if we only got to understand the structure and 
organization of the system (the hardware) and the software by which it works in 
a more complete manner. 
For instance Francis Crick1 expresses himself in this way (Crick & Koch, 1998, 
2005): 
“You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your 
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of 
a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associate molecules. As Lewis Carroll’s 
Alice might have phrased it: ‘You’re nothing that a pack of neurons (nerve cells)’”. 
In a similar way, after an introduction on formal languages and logical opera-
tions, simply intended as a set of rules that enables us to obtain new strings from 
former given strings, and tried to discuss in such terms the workings of the 
brain, Douglas R. Hofstadter (well-known scholar of artificial intelligence) writes 
(Hofstadter, 1980): 
“Looking back on what we have discussed, you might think to yourself, ‘These 
speculation about brain and mind are all well and good, but what about the feel-
ings involved in consciousness? These symbols may trigger each other all they 
want, but unless someone perceives the whole thing there’s no consciousness.” 
This makes sense to our intuition on some level, but it does not make sense 
logically. For we would then be compelled to look for an explanation of the me-
chanism which does the perceiving of all the active symbols, if it is not covered 
by what we have described so far. Of course a “soulist” would not have to look 
any further; he would merely assert that the perceiver of all this neural action is 
the soul, which cannot be described in physical terms and that is that. However 
we shall try to give a “non-soulist” explanation of where consciousness arises. 
Our alternative to the soulist explanation (and a disconcerting one it is, too) is 
to stop at the symbol level and say, “This is it; this is what consciousness is. 
Consciousness is that property of a system that arises whenever there exist sym-
bols in the system which obey triggering patterns somewhat like the one de-
scribed in the past several sections.” 
In the context of a reductionist interpretation, in the assumption that every-
thing can be explained in purely physical terms, the existence of an actual free-
dom of action is essentially denied by appealing to the physical determinism. It 
is said: given certain initial conditions, corresponding to given sensorial stimuli 
and to a given internal state of the brain, the response would be uniquely deter-
 
 
1Francis Crick, Nobel laureate for Biology and Medicine 1962 together with J. D. Watson for the 
discovery of the DNA structure, moved successively to Neurophysiology. 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.83023 319 Open Journal of Philosophy 
 
M. Ceroni, G. M. Prosperi 
 
minate without any space for a different behavior. Actually, we know that this is 
true only for Classic Physics, while the most fundamental Physics, Quantum 
Physics, necessary to study the elementary processes, is not deterministic, in the 
sense that, even given a complete knowledge of the state of the system, only sta-
tistical predictions can be done on its successive behavior. However, often one 
says that a living organism should behave in a classical way, being made of a very 
large number of atoms or molecules. 
A second matter that is often mentioned is the result of retarded awareness 
experiments, starting from the Benjamin Libet experiments and their successive 
developments. It is claimed that such experiments would show that all our ac-
tions start in an unconscious way. 
In the following pages we shall be back to both questions. 
But there is a last topic about free will that we want to raise and which is al-
most completely ignored today; it is its role in the process of knowledge. All our 
culture, even philosophical culture, considers free will as the free energy through 
which human beings act in order to accomplish a purpose, a decision, a judge-
ment, a discovery that human reason has acknowledged. As we will see through 
an experiential analysis free will intervenes and determines and influences in a 
very relevant way the process of knowledge; it is essential for a true understand-
ing. 
The plan of the paper is the following. In Sections 2 and 3 we recall some basic 
notions on neurons, their properties, the nature and transmission of the nervous 
signals, the structure of the central nervous system. In Section 4 we confront the 
physical aspects of the cerebral processes and the nature of the subjective per-
ceptions related to them. In Section 5 we discuss Liebt’s experiments on retarded 
awareness; in Section 6 the role of Quantum Theory in the understanding of the 
cerebral processes and in what sense we can talk of a complementarity of the 
point of view of Physics and of Introspection; in Section 7 the implications of 
feeling and free will in knowledge. Finally in Section 8 we summarize our point 
of view. 
2. Physics and Physiology of the Nervous Cells 
Obviously living organisms are made of the same particles, atoms and molecules 
that build the inanimate world. So there is no doubt that all the processes that 
occur in them have to be described in terms of the same Physics. In particular 
this must be true for the processes that occur in our nervous system and in our 
brain, so it is natural that our entire psychic activity, our perceptions, our acts of 
will have always a physical counterpart. 
As is well-known, our nervous system is made of active cells, neurons, and 
other cells, the glial cells, whose function of support and nutrition for the pre-
ceding ones, however, is not completely understood. Neurons are made of a 
central body of different shapes that contains the nucleus and pushes out in ir-
regular filaments, dendrites, aimed at increasing the cell surface. A single regular 
and larger filament, axon, leaves the central body. This can be very long (it can 
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even reach one meter in length in some case) and it branches out in its end part 
by making contacts with various other cells. Often an axon is surrounded by 
white matter, myelin, an insulator layer made by other cells (oligodendrocites), 
which wraps around the axon in many spirals. This layer breaks at intervals, 
leaving short uncovered gaps, nodes of Ranvier, essential for the propagation of 
action potentials. The axon branches end with bulges in the shape of buttons on 
the surface of the dendrites or on the central body of another neuron, on the 
membrane of an endocrine cell or in the form of an endplate over a muscle fiber. 
These buttons or end plates are generally not in direct contact with the mem-
brane of the target cell, but they are separated by gaps filled with liquid of about 
20 thousand micron, synapses. 
A neuron is essentially aimed at transmitting and receiving signals. Inside the 
single neuron such transmission is of electric nature. Between one cell and 
another, through synapses, it is of chemical type. A signal from a sensorial re-
ceptor or coming from another neuron, is received through one of the synapses 
present on the dendrites, propagates along the axon and hits successive cells 
through the later terminal synapses. 
From the electric point of view (Hille, 2001), in rest conditions the cell inte-
rior is polarized negatively relatively to the external liquid. Such polarization re-
sults from the combined action of an active transport and a passive migration of 
ions through the cell membrane. Cellular membrane is built by a double layer of 
molecules of phospholipids, with the polar heads (phosphoric groups) towards 
the two surfaces. Such membrane is impervious to ions and to the big polar mo-
lecules. Their transport through the membrane is controlled by complex protein 
molecules (made by the aggregation of three, four or more, simpler unities). 
These are inserted in the thickness of the membrane and cross it completely. 
Some of them are structured as selective channels, which enable the transfer of 
only specific ions. They can be permanently open or equipped with a gate me-
chanism. Others act as actual carrier devices, which work at the expense of 
energy released by the decay of an ATP (adenine-triphosphate) in an ADP mo-
lecule (adenine-diphosphate).2 In a neuron such structures are spread on the en-
tire surface of the dendrites, on the central body and along the axon on the 
nodes of Ranvier. 
The settling of membrane potential (the difference of potential between the 
inside and the outside of a cell) is the consequence of the concomitant action of 
potassium channels which allow a free flux of K+ ions from the inside to the out-
side of the cell and of the sodium-potassium carriers. The latter are molecules 
that have receptor sites for Na+ and K+ ions. In its normal conformation this 
kind of molecule is open toward the inside and leave exposed the receptors for 
 
 
2ATP is a typical molecule used by the biological systems to stock energy ready to be used. It is 
made by an organic radical, adenosine, constituted in turn by a nitrous basis, adenine, a sugar, ri-
bose, and three phosphoric groups bound together in a chain with elimination of water molecules. 
It is an endothermic compound kept by appropriate potential barriers. By dividing for hydrolysis in 
one molecule of phosphoric acid and one of ADP, the ATP molecule releases an energy of 0.32 eV 
(electronvolts). 
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the Na+ ions that tend to bind on such sites, while the K+ receptors remain cov-
ered. Statistically this molecule can take a phosphoric group and the corres-
ponding energy from an ATP molecule present in the cytoplasm. When this 
happens it goes to an excited state and tends to change conformation, opening 
toward the outside, releasing the Na+ ions and exposing the K+ receptors binding 
the latter type of ions. At this point it again changes conformation, opens again 
toward inside and releases the phosphoric group and the K+ ions, assuming 
again the original conformation. The net result of all this process is that every 
three Na+ ions brought outside, two K+ ions are brought inside. This is how an 
outside excess of Na+ and an inside excess of K+ are generated, but with an un-
balance of positive electric charges toward the outside. Due to the difference of 
concentration the K+ ions tend to reflow toward outside trough their proper 
channels, which on the contrary do not allow the Na+ ions to reflow toward the 
inside. The K+ flux carries on until an equilibrium is reached, according to 
Boltzmann law, with the electric field created by the excess of positive charges in 
the outside of the membrane. This situation is reached for an inside potential of 
about −70 to −90 mV (millivolts) in nearly all animal cells. 
In the membranes of neurons, muscular fibers and other types of cells, electro 
sensitive sodium channels are present together with the potassium channels. 
Such electro-sensitive channels are normally closed. However if by any means 
one produces an electric depolarization, larger than a sharp threshold (about 15 
mV), on the surface on a dendrite or on the body of a neuron, those next to it 
tend to open, allowing a flux of Na+ toward inside and producing in the nearby a 
pick of depolarization. Then, in a few milliseconds they close again and pass to 
an inactive state, allowing the sodium-potassium carriers to reestablish the rest 
situation. The process is helped by electro-sensitive potassium channel which 
also opens with a certain delay and keeps open until the depolarization ends. 
The brief pulse of depolarization produced in this way (action potential) trans-
mits to the nearby membrane and propagates along the axon with a very large 
velocity, which can reach even 100 m/s and arrives eventually to the synaptic 
buttons. 
In the postsynaptic surfaces of the cells reached by the branches of the axon, 
chemical sensitive channels are present. The arrival of an action potential to the 
synaptic buttons produce in these a release of appropriate substances present in-
side the buttons (neuro-transmitters) in the inter-synaptic space. These sub-
stances are enclosed in vesicles which open toward the outside of the cell under 
the intermediate action of electro-sensitive calcium channels. Neuro-transmitter 
molecules can be captured on appropriate ligand receptors present in the exte-
rior structure of the chemical sensitive channels, the latter then tend to open, al-
lowing a reflux of positive ions and producing a depolarization in the adjacent 
membrane. In this way in a neuron chain signal transmits electrically along a 
neuron and chemically to a successive neuron, to a muscular fiber or to a cell of 
an endocrine gland. Among the most used neuro-transmitters substances there 
is glutamic acid in the central nervous system, acetylcholine in the peripheral 
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nervous system and in the transmission to a muscular fiber and adrenaline par-
ticularly in the autonomous nervous system. The transmission time of a signal 
through a synapsis is about 1 ms. 
Beside the neurons whose axons make excitatory synapses, there are other 
neurons that make inhibitory synapses and use other substances as neu-
ro-transmitters (typically GABA, gamma-aminobutyric acid). No neuron can 
make both types of synapsis, but can receive both. In the inhibitory synapses the 
chemical-sensitive channels set in the postsynaptic membrane allow only the 
passage of negative ions (like chlorine ions, CI−) and their opening has the effect 
of hyperpolarizing this membrane blocking or possibly reducing the effect of 
signals coming through excitatory synapses. On the surface of a single neuron a 
very large number of synapses (from 1000 to 10,000) is present coming from 
other neurons. Some of them may be excitatory, others inhibitory. Therefore a 
cell receives conflicting signals. So it is not a simple transmitter, but it may have 
an actual integration function. 
Furthermore there are other types of neurons, pacemaker neurons, that, con-
tinuously, or in bursts when activated, emit rhythmic signals with frequencies 
from few Hertz (one pulse per second) to about 40 Hertz. This mechanism is es-
sentially the result of the combined action of calcium electro-sensitive channels 
(similar to the sodium one but with a much longer response time, of the order of 
fraction of second) which open as a consequence of a depolarization and other 
types of channels permeable to some positive ions (Iv channels permeable to Na+ 
and K+ ions and Kir channels permeable to K+ alone) that open under the effect 
of an hyperpolarization. Pacemaker cardiac neurons are of this type, but even 
others occurring particularly in the thalamus and in the hippocampus, which 
seem to play an important role in the conscious states and in establishing mem-
ory. 
Contrary to the idea of physical determinism, we must stress that the events 
we have described, specifically the opening of channels, typically involve con-
formation changes of single molecules and are therefore governed by the Quan-
tum Mechanics laws and are not of a deterministic kind. In particular the depo-
larization of the membrane in which an electro-sensitive channel is inserted, or 
the capture of a molecule of neuro-transmitter by a chemically-sensitive channel, 
only elicits an increasing probability that the channel will open. The same can be 
said, due also to its sharp threshold, of the starting of an action potential, which 
strictly follows a yes or no rule. That is why above several times we have used the 
term “it tends”. 
3. Structure of Our Nervous System 
Let us consider the structure of the nervous system on the whole. This is consti-
tuted by the receptors of the sense organs, the peripheral nervous system, the 
central nervous system and the autonomous nervous system. The sensory re-
ceptors convert various types of external or internal stimuli to nervous impulses. 
The peripheral nervous system carries the signals elicited by the receptors to the 
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central nervous system and the responses elaborated by the latter to the effector 
organs, muscles (in particular voluntary skeletal muscles) and glands. The cen-
tral nervous system is the place of the response elaboration and memory con-
servation. It is constituted by an axial cylindrical part enclosed in the vertebral 
column, the spinal cord, and by the brain or encephalon, which in turn consists 
of the encephalic trunk with the cerebellum annexed and the cerebrum (or te-
lencephalon). 
The cerebrum is divided in two hemispheres connected by a bundle of fibers 
that makes the corpus callosum. Every hemisphere consists in a cerebral cortex, 
grayish in color, which in humans is about 3 mm thick, divided in various layers 
or strata and in an internal white part. The bodies of the majority of the neurons 
which make up the organ are located in the cortex. They are organized in co-
lumnar structures perpendicular to the surface, which are functioning unities. 
The internal part of the cerebrum mainly consists in the axons (with their mye-
lin protection) that leave from or arrive in the cortex cells and connect the co-
lumnar structures in various ways. Furthermore, at the bottom of the cerebrum 
there are some important structures among which the thalamus, the hypothala-
mus, the hippocampus, which have important functions in linking the sensorial 
receptors and in controlling the connections among the various areas of the cor-
tex. 
The autonomous nervous system has regulation and control functions of the 
internal organs, but it never reaches the level of consciousness and therefore is of 
minor interest for our problem. 
The peripheral nervous neurons can be distinguished in afferent neurons, 
which transmit signals to the central nervous system from the sensorial recep-
tors, and efferent neurons, connecting the nervous central system to effector or-
gans. Their axons are gathered in bundles that constitute the nerves. The afferent 
neurons project their signals through some intermediate structures, among 
which the thalamus in the majority of the cases, into primary specific areas of 
the cortex. There are a primary somatic-sensorial area, a primary visual area, a 
primary auditory area, etc. Different parts of these areas are connected to the 
various types of tactile receptors located in various parts of our body, light re-
ceptors located in the retina and sensitive to the various color, auditory receptors 
in resonance with the different musical notes. The muscles are controlled by ef-
ferent nerves that leave from the primary motor areas, located on everyone he-
misphere immediately ahead the so called central sulcus or Roland sulcus, and 
different regions are connected with the muscles in the different parts of the 
body. The signals coming from these areas are just what produce and regulate 
the muscle contractions. 
On the whole, the various sensory and motor areas occupy 5% of the cortex, 
the remainder constitutes the so called associative areas and is devolved to a 
synthesis function, an elaboration of the responses and the conservation of 
memory. The sensory and the motor areas are connected to the latter in a com-
plex way; partly through bottom structures, typically the hypothalamus, which, 
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among other things carries out a filter function. There are various type of mem-
ory, a short time memory or working memory, which is located in the hippo-
campus, and a long time memory; a declarative memory, which can be recalled 
at the level of consciousness, a procedural memory, which, after a training pe-
riod, intervenes largely in an unconscious way in the regulation of movements, 
in the recognition of an image or of a sound. The long time memory consists in 
neuron circuits which are built by reinforcing certain synapses and excluding 
other ones, it would seem under the action of the hippocampus in the case of the 
declarative memory, of other structures in the case of the procedural memory. 
The location of the latter seems to be in the corresponding specific areas them-
selves. The recalling of a memory, when it is necessary, corresponds to the acti-
vation of one or more such circuities; a working memory is rebuilt guiding the 
action in development. 
A large part of actions and reactions of our nervous system develop in an au-
tomatic and unconscious way. It would seem that the level of consciousness is 
reached with the simultaneous activation of all the areas of our cortex involved 
in each specific sensation or action, guided by the gamma waves, 40 Hertz fre-
quency signals emitted by pacemaker cells of the thalamus. A complex mechan-
ism of inhibition and counter-inhibition should be at the basis of shifting our 
attention, with the activation of certain areas and deactivation of others. 
Due to the complexity of our central nervous system it is not generally possi-
ble to follow how a certain excitation pattern develops in detail, how the infor-
mation coming from the sensorial receptors is elaborated and how finally the 
signals to the effector muscles are produced. By the present means so far, how-
ever, enormous progresses have been made in understanding the role and the 
function of the various cerebral structures and in identifying the various circuits. 
4. Physics of the Cerebral Processes and Subjective  
Perceptions 
Even if very many problems still remain unsolved, as we have already said, it 
should be clear from the preceding brief notes, all our behaviors and conscious 
or unconscious activities appear related to physical processes which occur in our 
nervous system. However the description of such processes is given in terms of 
ions distributions and fluxes, electric signal propagation, changes in molecule 
conformations. There is nothing that could make reference to the appearing of 
awareness, to our subjective perceptions and much less so to our personal iden-
tity. There is nothing in the physical description that can explain our way of 
perceiving light, forms, colors, heat and cold, musical notes etc.; in a word the so 
called qualia. 
As regards, for instance, think of our perception of colors. Our eye can be 
viewed as a system of lenses that projects the image of an object upon our retina. 
There are various types of receptors on the retina, rods, which are at the basis of 
our black and white vision, and three types of cones, related to our perception of 
colors containing three different pigments that absorb light in three different re-
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gions of the visible spectrum, around the red, the yellow and the blue wave 
lengths. These receptors are in contact with neurons that project their signals 
into different cells of the primary visual cortex, located in the occipital region. At 
the level of this cortex the image of the object is broken up in different aspects of 
vision. We know for certain that at least four features are sent to other specific 
cortex areas: colors, forms, movements of objects, field dept. Then specific maps 
are re-elaborated and projected in various ways into other cortex areas and par-
ticularly into frontal cortex areas. We do not yet know for certain haw the final 
synthesis is attained. It is assumed that there is no last synthesis area, but that 
this is the result of the connections of the various cortical areas. It should be the 
simultaneous activation of all these areas, under the action of specific thalamus 
nuclei, which brings about our conscious perception and offers us a unitary 
scene, with all its forms and colors and rich in details our vision shows every 
time. 
However, we know that there are people with visual defects, daltonians, who 
do not distinguish some colors from others, color blinds, who do not perceive 
colors at all (they can see only black and white vision). These people miss one or 
more species of cones. Obviously nothing can remedy to the lack of a direct ex-
perience of them and no description of the physical processes related to vision of 
the kind we have attempt can be able to communicate our perception of the col-
or or colors lacking. Our subjective perceptions, the very consciousness of our-
selves appear incommensurable with the description of the physical processes 
that occur and, consequently, cannot simply be reduced to them. The association 
itself of our conscious experiences with the activation of certain cerebral struc-
tures rather that with others can be achieved only questioning the person. 
So the already mentioned Benjamin Libet writes (Libet, 2004): 
“In fact, conscious mental phenomena are not reducible or explicable by 
knowledge of nerve cell activities. You could look into the brain and see nerve 
cell interconnections and neural messages popping about in immense profusion. 
But you would not observe any conscious mental subjective phenomena. Only a 
report by the individual who is experiencing such phenomena could tell you 
about them.” 
Physics corresponds to a particular visual angle from which we look at reality. 
Due to a fundamental choice of method, Physics keeps subjectivity out of its 
consideration. Subjectivity is necessarily presupposed, but it is put between 
brackets, so to say, and we cannot expect to find it again in its framework, if not 
at the price of circularities and serious contradictions. 
Galileo himself had postulated a restriction to considering what were later 
called primary qualities alone, that is the measurable and quantifiable aspects of 
objects. These were considered actual properties of the objects compared to sec-
ondary qualities, related to subjectivity perceptions and therefore rather to a re-
lationship of the object with the subject. In Physics all quantities have to be de-
fined in an operative way, all conventions must be explicitly stated and a ma-
thematical language must be adopted. Efficient causes alone are considered ex-
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planation elements, while any reference to final causes is excluded as considered 
typical of intentionality and intelligence. A hypothetical deductive method is as-
sumed, models and theories must be empirically verifiable and are justified ac-
cording to their explicative and predictive power. 
These are the constitutive choices that make Physics a public science, whose 
theoretical conclusions can be verified by anyone with the necessary mathemat-
ical competence and which control experiments should be always repeatable on 
principle. It is a science whose statements are somehow incontrovertible, at least 
in specific frameworks. These are the reasons for its great success, but also those 
that define its limits. 
Naturally, as we said, Physics presupposes subjectivity. To state its method, 
introduce its concepts, stipulate its linguistic conventions, establish its control 
protocols, it necessarily has to make reference to a previous language and this 
can be only the natural language. It has therefore to refer to a set of concepts 
whose roots are in our primary experiences, which cannot even be communi-
cated, but that everybody has to experience personally. Fundamental concepts, 
like to be, to feel, to understand, the concept of truth, the concept of implication, 
but even more specific experiences, like perception of event in progress, object in 
space, light, sound, heat, are of this type and are all at the basis of important 
preconceptions. Every attempt to forget this circumstance brings to aporias and 
circularities. In this connection, the discussion may be interesting about the role 
of language in the development of cognitions given in Perlovsky (2012), in the 
perspective of Free Will and Cognitive Science and references therein. 
In the development of Physics, preconceptions and subjective experience are 
necessarily taken as a basis for successive operative definitions, but then, as we 
said, they are put between brackets. As a result a physical theory necessarily 
knows only the third person, there is no place in it for a first person. From the 
point of view of Physics we are simply impersonal automats. I experience my 
body as my body, you your body as your body, but there is no place in physics 
for concepts as my, your, his, her. Our personal identity itself has nothing to do 
with concepts of a physical nature. As we said, experiences like those of qualia, 
of consciousness of ourselves, our personal identity, cannot even be expressed in 
the language of Physics. Every one of us feels himself as something absolutely 
unique, unrepeatable, individual. Through our life and the changes that can af-
fect our body, we have the perception of remaining always ourselves; even if all 
our memories were erased, we would feel to be always us to feel a pain, a plea-
sure, any sensation. Each one of us was born at a particular time of History, in a 
particular place and from particular parents, but why that particular person is 
me? There is no answer in Physics. All this has no sense for Physics and in Phys-
ics even the concept of the individuality of a system, of a structure, is extremely 
weakened. 
At the most fundamental level, present Physics does not put the concept of 
particle but the concept of field, of quantum field. A field is thought as an entity 
distributed in the entire space. Reality is conceived as a system of fields and the 
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state of minimum energy of this system stands for absence of matter (vacuum 
state). Occurrence of matter, of a particle or of a structure is depicted as a spe-
cific excited state of such fields. Such excitations are localized within the limits 
allowed by the Heisenberg incertitude principle and differ for the particular state 
of excitation of the various fields involved. One can recognize some individuality 
to two different structures as long as they differ for their localization and type of 
excitation, and they maintain it until they remain separated and change in a 
continuous manner, but they lose it completely as soon as they overlap. A system 
of two electrons is something different from twice an electron, and this circums-
tance has very important consequences even on the properties of the macros-
copic matter as we know it. 
In the face of these circumstances, a reductionist can go as far as denying that 
terms as consciousness, awareness, consciousness of one have a meaning. Refer-
ring to Hofstater’s passage we cited, there is an obvious attempt to replace the 
term consciousness, which is indefinable and refers to a fundamental experience 
of ours, with an operative definition, the only viable one in Physics. However 
this definition cannot gather the essential meaning of awareness and could per-
fectly be applicable to so many automatic systems that nobody would dream of 
considering conscious. The concept itself of self has been questioned, by refer-
ring in some way to David Hume’s conceptions. Between ‘800 and ‘900, for in-
stance, Ernst Mach so wrote in his book “The analysis of sensations and the rela-
tion between the physical and psychical reality”3: 
“So the world for us does not consist in mysterious essences which, by inte-
racting with another essence, just as mysterious, myself, generate the “sensa-
tions” which alone are accessible to us. […] First of all, relatively more lasting 
(functionally) coordinate complexes of colors, sounds, pressures, etc. stand out 
in space and time; just for this reason such complexes assume specific names 
and are denoted as bodies, but they are not at all, absolutely persistent […]. 
Furthermore, there is a complex of memories, dispositions, relatively persistent 
and related to a specific body, denoted as me.” 
So terms like I or me would be terms that simply denote a complex of “mem-
ories, dispositions, feelings,…”. Terms of this type however have no meaning 
without the subject of those experiences. The aporias of Mach’s conceptions are 
evident. The point is that the secondary qualities cannot be ignored, even if for a 
methodologic choice, they are left out of the context of Physics and of the ma-
jority of the other experimental sciences. Obviously, Psichology and Neurology 
must refer necessarily to secondary qualities, as they try to relate cerebral 
processes to conscious perceptions. However, the fact itself that this could be 
achieved only by questioning the person, shows the irreducibility of the latter to 
 
 
3E. Mach can be considered one of the precursors of the neo-positivist trend. He is well known 
above all for an historic critic study on Newtonian Mechanics and for the formulation of an equiva-
lence principle between gravitational forces and inertial forces by which Einstein was inspired for 
his General Relativity Theory. In the context of his conception of Science, however, Mach did never 
want acknowledge Relativity Theory either the reality of atoms. 
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the first. Obviously, the point of view of introspection must be considered com-
plementary to the point of view of the external sense on which Physics is based. 
This was very much the position of e.g. Niels Bohr, the father of modern Atomic 
Physics and in a way of Quantum Mechanics. Our inner world, the world of our 
thoughts, of our sensations, of our feelings, cannot be reduced to the inanimate 
world, whatever its connection with our physical being. And yet it is as real as 
the physical one and it is the most important for us, as already Ludwig Witt-
genstein acknowledged in a comment on his famous Tractatus logi-
co-philosophicus sent to the editor. 
As regards to the problem of free will, it should be clear that, if our subjectivi-
ty cannot be reduced to understanding the processes that occur in our nervous 
system, the matter vanishes of physical determinism against our possibility of a 
free choice, and the possibility of an action of our mind on our physical being 
has to be accepted. This has to be true independently of any attempt to under-
stand how Physics and subjectivity could be put together at a more fundamental 
level. In any way, however, to the latter, one has to remember that living systems 
have to be viewed as mesoscopic rather than macroscopic systems on the level of 
their inner constitution, and reference to Quantum Theory is essential to treat 
the processes which occur in them. 
5. Libet’s Experiments on Retarded Awareness 
Libet’s results are essentially of two different types: delay in the conscious per-
ception of a sensorial stimulus and delay in becoming conscious even of a see-
mingly voluntary action. 
In the first type of experiments, it was verified that an electric impulse applied 
to any point of the skin was perceived with a 0.5 sec delay if with intensity above 
a certain minimal threshold. A similar single stimulus did not produce any sen-
sation, if directly applied to the corresponding surface of the somatic-sensorial 
area, even if of a much higher intensity than the threshold value. On the con-
trary an impulse chain with a frequency of 20 Hertz, was perceived as coming 
from the corresponding skin area, only if its length was of at least 0.5 sec, other-
wise it was not perceived at all. Such results seem to indicate that about 0.5 sec is 
necessary for the cerebral processes corresponding to the activation of con-
sciousness to develop. It is clear particularly and it is in a sense according to our 
daily experience, that a similar delay must occur when a sudden stimulus pro-
duces a reaction conditioned by our procedural memory, as for instance in the 
case of a sudden obstacle occurring when we are driving. The activation of the 
reaction command in the cortex occurs before we become conscious of the 
problem. However, after becoming conscious and before executing the com-
mand, that is before the actual contraction of the appropriate muscles, there is a 
brief time interval (about 0.15 sec), during which we can exercise a veto and stop 
or direct the action in a different way. 
In the second set of experiments the person was required to make a move-
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ment with a finger or bending his/hers wrist at chance and to read at what time 
this occurred on an appropriate chronometer4. Correspondingly the beginning 
of the cortex activation was registered by a contact set in the appropriate posi-
tion on the head surface. Once again a delay of 0.5 sec was found between the 
cortex activation and the time indicated by the person, but again he could inter-
vene with a veto before the movement was actually performed. This would seem 
to show that the initial command was independent of displaying consciousness 
even in this case and therefore it were the cause rather than the consequence of 
the act of volition. 
Clearly the first type of experiment has no relation with free will, the second 
could appear to contradict it. Against such a conclusion Libet appeals to the pos-
sibility of a veto. The initial stimulus would start quite independently of our will; 
however by the power of veto we could later direct it. Actually the second type of 
results seem very different from the first. In the first case we have an automatic 
response determined by training and according to a preset program, contained 
in the procedural memory, as it happens even in other reactions that do not even 
reach the level of consciousness. One could think of muscular contractions 
which are necessary to walk, to ride a bicycle, drive a car. In the second case the 
choice of the time of the movement is left to the person and should be different 
for each event. To deny a role to the person will even to the origin of the process 
would amount to do not give any reason for the choice of a moment rather than 
another. The most obvious interpretation would seem to be that 0.5 sec. is ac-
tually the time necessary to activate the various processes necessary to shift the 
attention of the subject from the choice of lifting his finger to reading the chro-
nometer, in line this with the Crick idea of a search light that moves on the cor-
tex. Such time is reasonably just as the time necessary to activate a conscious 
sensation. Another possibility could be that the delay is the time between the 
viewing the light spot on the screen and the awareness of the vision, which again 
we know to be 0.5 sec. A third line of explanation could be that consciousness 
and free will are active in “being ready” for the motoric decision. When decision 
is taken, automatic, unconscious, fast stimulus starts and the person become 
aware of the movement with the usual 0.5 sec delay. 
6. Quantum Theory and Cerebral Processes 
Let us come back to the importance of Quantum Theory for describing cerebral 
processes. 
As we said, the activation of an action potential in a single neuron involves 
processes on the molecular level and cannot generally be of a deterministic type. 
This circumstance would be disastrous in transmitting signals from motor areas 
to muscles or from sensorial receptors to the corresponding cortices. In such 
cases, however, Nature remedies by a multiplication of the contacts. The neural 
 
 
4This consisted in a luminous spot moving on a circle on the screen of a cathodic tube at the veloci-
ty of 1 rotation every 2.56 seconds. 
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plates, by which the moto-neuron axons establish contacts with the muscular fi-
bers, are equivalent to a hundred synapses and make practically certain the re-
sponse of the fibers. Neurons of the IV stratum of the cortex, to which the sig-
nals arrive from the sensorial receptors carried by the afferent neurons, establish 
contacts with the neurons of the adjacent layers by means of cartridge structures, 
which consist in clusters of synapses placed on the apical dendrite of the target 
cell. On the contrary quantum indetermination is likely to play an important 
role in the response of the associative cortex. 
As already pointed out by Henry Poincaré (referring originally to the so called 
three body system) a characteristic of the complex systems is to be extremely 
sensitive to initial conditions. This means that a very small modification can 
bring about completely different developments. In this situation one can expect 
that quantum indetermination in the response of the single neurons could 
emerge at the level of their collective behavior. In other words if, taking a similar 
attitude to that of Laplace, we imagined to know the state of the brain in all de-
tails at a certain time (as is implicated by the signals which arrive to primary 
cortices from the various internal and external receptors, by its memory assets 
and by the general condition of the body) and if we could solve the extremely 
complicated corresponding Schrödinger equation, we should not expect a 
unique response, but the possibility of a plurality of responses each with a spe-
cific probability significantly smaller than 1. 
On the basis of this observation some scientists, like the theoretical physicist 
Henry Stapp, have tried to relate our mind’s physical action to the quantum 
mechanical axiom of the wave function reduction. 
One of the most anti-intuitive aspects of Quantum Theory is the principle of 
superposition of states. If the system is in a superposition of states (represented 
by certain wave functions), each corresponding to one of the different admitted 
values of a certain observable quantity, it is not possible to attribute without 
contradiction a definite value to the quantity independently of an actual obser-
vation. This is due to the occurrence of the interference terms, which in turn are 
a consequence of the fact that the probabilities depend on the square of the wave 
function, while the wave functions compose linearly. The experimenter has the 
possibility to choose among different types of observation corresponding to dif-
ferent ways of decomposing the wave function and therefore generally incom-
patible. Of this type there is what we can call the observation of the position or 
of the momentum of a particle. The operator can choose the question to ask na-
ture and the time to ask the question. Once that a specific observation has been 
made and one of the possible results has been obtained, however, the wave func-
tion has to be redefined and matched to the function corresponding to the value 
found (wave function reduction)5 Therefore it is clear that the wave function can-
not have a physical meaning in itself but it has to be considered a mathematical 
tool to calculate the probability that an experiment can give a certain result. As 
 
 
5This comes essentially from a physical continuity requirement, the requirement that an immediate 
repetition of the observation give the same result. 
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disconcerting as this aspect of the theory could appear, the theory is at the basis 
of the all modern Physics and has enabled us to understand the properties of the 
most elementary components and the collective properties of matter in the most 
various and exceptional conditions. Its predictions turned out to be always cor-
rect in the most various situations and with great precision. 
The term observation used above, in fact, does not immediately refer to the 
human observer, it denotes the result recorded by a measurement apparatus. 
That is, it describes the effect that the interaction of the object with the appara-
tus has produced in the latter. However, since even the apparatus is a physical 
object, constituted by the same atoms and molecules which build the object ob-
served, it too has to be described according to Quantum Theory at the funda-
mental level. In principle, therefore, even any statement on the apparatus must 
refer to a second apparatus observing it. In this way a chain is created that nec-
essarily has to extend to the nervous system of the human observer. 
Given such premises, one can understand why the sense and the implications 
of the theory could be the object of discussions even today and why various at-
tempts at a reformulation have been made. However according to what is today’s 
most consistent interpretation, due to the great mathematician John von Neu-
mann (to make original ideas of Niels Bohr6 more consistent) and strongly sup-
ported by Eugene Wigner7, it is just becoming aware of a subject (von Neumann, 
1932; Bohr, 1928; Wigner, 1971, 1987; Wheeler & Zurek 1983) that allows us to 
break the chain and produces the reduction of the wave. According to this type 
of interpretation a reference to a conscious being, thought as extra physical, ap-
pears essential. 
In this perspective the consciousness would simply seem to take note of the 
result and so to play only a passive role. However there is an important theorem, 
which follows from the basic postulates of the theory, according to which a repe-
tition at very closed successive times of the observation of a quantity would 
freeze the quantity at its initial value. According to Stapp a sensorial stimulus 
would induce a superposition state in the brain, corresponding to various possi-
ble responses of the organ. By focusing on the development of the process, more 
or less in the long run and at an appropriate time, the mind could stop it carry-
ing out a veto function, if it is not desired, or let it free of occurring, by address-
ing in this way the course of events (Stapp, 1993, 1999). 
A more reasonable alternative would seem, however, to attribute to the mind 
a more explicitly active role in the quantum lack of determinism. The important 
 
 
6Niels Bohr, Nobel Laureate for Physics 1922, is famous for his atomic model and for the introduc-
tion of the idea of energetic level. He was the recognized referent for the interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics.  According to him Q. M. must be understood as a theory that makes forecasts of actual 
experiments performed on an object, providing specific probabilities for the various possible out-
comes. To attribute to a quantity of the object a value independently of an observation has no 
meaning, as we said. The experimental framework however and the result of the experiment have to 
be described in classical terms, that is in terms of quantities having a well determined value. The 
classical language is understood as the language of our experience. 
7Eugene Wigner is one of the most important theoretical physicist of the last century, Nobel Prizes, 
he is particularly famous for having set the basis for the study of symmetry in Quantum Theory. 
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point is that there does not exist a physical cause for the occurrence of one or 
other among different possible responses. From the point of view of Physics the 
result is purely casual in every single occurrence and only in a very large number 
of repetitions of the process, under the same starting conditions, an actual dis-
tribution of responses could be attained, which tends to the probability distribu-
tion. The proposal of the neurophysiologist John Eccles (Nobel Laureate 1953) is 
that our mind can act on the associative cortex at the level of the synapses, by 
modifying the quantum probabilities (Eccles, 1986), addressing the responses in 
a sense rather that in another and making intentional what would be casual ac-
cording to Physics. 
Eccles’s proposal was made in the context of his dualistic interactionist inter-
pretation, which is a modern rebooting of Cartesian dualism in a sense. The 
mind is thought as an entity independent of the body, with which it communi-
cates through the associative cortex (Eccles & Popper, 1977). 
In the context of Neurology the Cartesian dualism, based on a sharp distinc-
tion between “res cogitans” (what thinks) and “res extensa” (what is extended) 
has been particularly criticized by Antonio Damasio, well known scholar for his 
studies on the cortical area at the basis of emotions (Damasio 1994). He starts 
from observing that the possibility itself of a thought appears related to the 
reaching of a sufficiently complex cerebral development at a very recent stage of 
biological evolution and, even in the development of the human being, it appears 
progressively during the growth. 
Actually Damasio’s criticism applies only to a radical interpretation of Des-
cartes conception and in this sense should not apply to Eccles, according to 
whom any action of the mind, including thought, would be carried out through 
the brain8 In fact even Eccles’s proposal, in the specific and very schematic terms 
in which was originally formulated, naively based on the Heisenberg9 
time-energy uncertainty rule, is rather informal and has been criticized from 
other points of view. However, at a general level it appears very suggestive under 
various aspects, and in no way constrained to the schematically dualistic concep-
tion in which it has been expressed. It keeps its entire value even in a more uni-
tary conception of the human being, somewhat more in according to Aristotle 
than to Plato10. We should look at what we can call the external sense, on which 
Physics is based, and the internal sense of introspection as to two different but 
complementary points of view, both essential, each non reducible to the other 
one, but concerning the same reality. This was in particular the position of Niels 
Bohr in analogy with the complementarity of the aspects of particle and wave in 
Quantum Mechanics. In a context of this type the quantum probabilities could 
 
 
8In a sense the proposal of Eccles amounts to conceive the mind as an operator that press the keys 
of a computer (the brain). The operator cannot do anything without the computer, but the com-
puter is dead without the operator. 
9Nobel laureate for Physics 1932, he is one of main founders of Quantum Mechanics. 
10A dualist conception like that of Descartes is not opposed only by materialists, as obvious, but sig-
nificantly even by the majority of the theologians, somewhat more in the line of St. Thomas of 
Aquino and so of Aristotle. 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.83023 333 Open Journal of Philosophy 
 
M. Ceroni, G. M. Prosperi 
 
be interpreted as expressing the intensity of conditionings. As we said, Physics 
does not provide a cause for the occurrence of one among the various possible 
conscious reactions to a set of stimuli, which appear casual from its point of 
view. From the point of view of introspection, however, the choice appears the 
result of an intention. Obviously, in this perspective, we must admit that in 
presence of a conscious being we have a departure from the quantum probability 
laws. Actually this would be just the sign of its presence and that this should be 
the case seems completely obvious. 
In the above sense Quantum Theory should provide the logical frame in 
which the two points of view of Physics and introspection could better compose. 
At this point one could pose another problem. From the point of view of in-
trospection we have experience only of our own self, of us as a conscious being. 
The physical similarity and the possibility of communicating and exchanging 
experiences with other men, mainly through natural language, convinces us of 
the existence of other selves. But what we can say about the other superior ani-
mals, which have too a complex brain, even if less developed than ours, and that 
have simpler reactions but even analogous to ours under certain aspects. Des-
cartes managed the difficulty, by denying that the animals had any form of con-
sciousness and stating that they were simply kind of machines. However, if it is 
true that animals cannot speak and appear lacking in reflected consciousness, 
they have manifestations too by which they do not appear to be completely de-
termined by instinct and they might seem to be provided by some feeling, as 
some kind of affection for dogs. The danger of anthropomorphisms is very high 
in this field, however, if we admit that animals are provided with a true psyche 
(Aristotle talked of sensitivity without intelligence), we should conclude that not 
only man but life itself cannot be reduced to a purely physical phenomenon, 
even if this may appear to be against common assumptions. However, this 
should not imply a kind of vague pan-phsychism, which in our opinion cannot 
solve anything and particularly cannot solve the problem of personal identity. 
7. Free Will, Feelings and Knowledge 
Finally, as we told, free will is essentially involved in the process of knowledge. 
Emotions, affectivity, the values in which we believe are at the basis of the moti-
vation of our research. They could be view as conditioning factors that interfere 
in our right reasoning, but they cannot be removed. They should be put in their 
proper place and in this our freedom plays an essential role. 
Modernity, from its origins in Italian Humanism and then to its Rationalistic 
development, exalts the reason for man as a means of grasping reality in its 
completeness (exhaustiveness of rational knowledge) and according to all its de-
tails (analyticity of knowledge). 
Such a conception sought the conditions that could provide complete and 
analytical knowledge, true and objective. From the beginning, this absolutization 
of the value of reason, based on an abstract idea of reason and not based on hu-
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man experience in its concreteness, has felt the feeling, the emotion and there-
fore the affirmation of value and interest (in the original sense of the word, that 
is, participation in the being of things) as an interference in the cognitive 
process, in deploying the use of the reason instrument. The discovery of the 
scientific method seemed to confirm beyond all doubts the truth of this concep-
tion: the reason in order to function correctly must be free from feeling, judg-
ment of value, and interest. Indeed, if this interference is not prevented as much 
as possible, the knowledge that is generated is false, erroneous, and not objective. 
This setting obviously is a true one because man is always tempted to manipulate 
the reality as he pleases. However, this has ended up creating the myth of pure 
knowledge, without interference of emotion, completely separate from any in-
terest and hence morally superior. Nowadays, it is common practice in scientific 
publications to enclose and sign documents attesting, at least declaratively, for-
mally, the lack of interest, the “conflict of interests”: disclaimer document. 
Scientific knowledge is still regarded as a process of pure knowledge without in-
terference of emotions, while it is well-known that in the scientific and technical 
world, in the field of scientific applications, there are huge economic interests 
and there are significant interferences of power, not only in dictatorial states, but 
also in our democratic countries. 
Therefore, if we start from human experience in its concreteness, as we can 
see it in the man who acts within the particular situation, we will easily find that 
reason is inseparable from the unity of the ego. Reason is not conceivable if we 
want to remain adherent to experience as a faculty separable from the human 
person with all its physical, psychic and existential characteristics in general. 
Physical pain, illness, a feeling of anger or disappointment for the misunders-
tanding of others inexorably affects the way of seeing and judging of the person, 
the way to use the reason instrument. In fact human knowledge is always deter-
mined by the totality of the conditions that characterize the person at a given 
moment. 
This underlining seems to argue for the need to separate reason from all in-
terfering factors, so a way of seeing this is rooted in our culture. Instead, it must 
be taken into account in its finding of fact, regardless of whether it is a favorable 
or adverse condition for man’s ability to know. 
This simple finding that reason is inseparable from the person in all the as-
pects that make it, introduces us to a fundamental observation about the rela-
tionship between reason and sentiment or more globally between reason and af-
fectivity. Any event that penetrates within the person’s experience is thus cap-
tured by its sensory channels and arrives up to the level of consciousness pro-
duces inexorably and mechanically also a reaction, a perturbation of the mood, 
arouses emotion and feeling. We stress the observation just made: whatever 
happens in the cognitive horizon of the person produces an inevitable, irresisti-
ble reaction, emotional modification, precisely to the extent of that person’s hu-
man livelihood. We would like to note that the word affection comes from a pas-
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sive Latin afficior verb, which indicates the repercussion that events bring about 
in man’s conscience: afficior means I’m hit by and then I react, I’m moved, 
struck. Here, the structure of the human person is such that anything that enters 
the horizon of perception and human knowledge is not recorded coldly and 
mechanically, as a photographic plate reproduces the scene to which it has been 
exposed, but causes an affective reaction that little or so much moves the whole 
person, affects knowledge. The object of knowledge as it is capable to affect, to 
attract the human reason is a value. Value is the reality known just as it affects 
the person, reality as “well worth” to be known and experienced. If the person 
has a narrow mind, the scope of value will be narrower than those who have a 
great soul and a deeper human sensitivity. The feeling, however, is the inevitable 
affective reaction resulting in the knowledge of something that crosses or pene-
trates the horizon of our experience and attracts it. Therefore, the reason in or-
der to know the object has to deal with feeling, with mood, is anyhow affected by 
these. 
At this point a fundamental observation emerges: the more one thing, an ob-
ject vitally affects the person, the more it will generate an intense affective reac-
tion and will disturb and condition the person and its reason. However, we note 
that, despite the scientific knowledge being considered as free from the influence 
of feelings and emotional reactions, which in any case should alter the data ob-
tained from the experiment, especially when we consider the moment of discov-
ery and innovation, researcher wonder and passion are fundamental. Only those 
who are emotionally involved, with all their own, with all their passion for re-
search, make scientific discoveries, which can then be appreciated in their value 
and in their objective clarity. “The ability to be amazed, to wonder at nature as 
something of a mysterious kind is identified by Einstein as the fundamental 
characteristic of the scientist” (Bersanelli & Gargantini, 2003). However, it re-
mains evident that objects determine an affective reaction that is as bigger as 
they have to do with the interest, happiness, fulfillment, and realization of the 
person. 
But then it would mean that as much as one thing interests me, moves me, I 
wish it, the less I can know it. The rationalistic and positivistic mentality typical 
of our world undoubtedly subscribes to this affirmation. According to this con-
ception nature would place man in this paradoxical situation: the more it pro-
vokes and raises the interest, the more it precludes the possibility of knowledge 
and therefore of possession and of realization. For this mentality, the problem of 
human origin, its destiny, the meaning of the world, the purpose of our life, love 
for others, the contradiction of pain and death cannot be addressed by rational, 
scientific knowledge and so they are purely subjective questions, that is, un-
knowable, that is, fundamentally nonexistent. Before joining such an unreasona-
ble hypothesis, it is worth exploring other possibilities. If, as we have seen, in our 
existential investigation that starts with the concrete man acting within the 
world, we come to find that little or so everything that enters our perceptive and 
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cognitive horizon provokes emotional perturbation in us, is not reasonable, in 
the name of a preconceived idea (pure and objective knowledge) to eliminate a 
factor of such importance. 
7.1. The Feeling in his Place 
As we have already anticipated, feeling, human emotion that makes us asto-
nished at things is not an interfering factor that needs to be eliminated. They are 
a tool that intensifies attention, extends the cognitive energy of reason, streng-
thens reason in its attempt to penetrate reality in its entirety. Certainly this func-
tion and the implementation of this mode is not automatic, mechanical: as a 
telescope made to approach distant objects and allow a distinct vision of them 
unless it is focused it prevents distinct vision, so feelings, affectivity are a tool 
that must be used reasonably, somehow focused and finely focused, if we want to 
prevent a reduction, distortion of knowledge. The problem then is not to elimi-
nate sentiment from the cognitive trajectory, but it is to put it in its proper place. 
That in order to judge man must be absolutely neutral, namely, absolutely in-
different to the object, abstractly may seem right, but in practice never happens. 
The concrete man is always the bearer of interests and aspirations and these al-
ways interfere with any judgment man faces, whatever object they seek to know. 
It is a mystification to imagine that the judgment with which reason seeks to at-
tain the truth of the object is more appropriate, dignified, and valid when the 
state of mind is in perfect ataraxia, in complete indifference. 
7.2. Reason and Freedom 
So the real problem is to understand what it means to “put the feelings in their 
proper place”. 
First of all, it should be emphasized that this is not a scientific issue, nor is it a 
cognitive one in the strict sense; it is a problem of attitude, in the way of being, 
the problem of an original position in front of the whole of reality. So let’s say 
the fundamental word to understand the nature of the problem: freedom, is a 
problem of freedom. 
When Pasteur proposed his discovery, that revolutionized and determined the 
whole Western medicine and allowed the framing and understanding of the pa-
thogenetic mechanisms of the most common diseases of the human race, that is, 
the discovery of microbes and that life can never be self-generated, but it comes 
only from the existing life, the last to believe it, that is, to recognize how things 
were in fact, were the professors of the Sorbonne. Why? Were they less intelli-
gent than ordinary students and people? Of course not! What made it so difficult 
for them to recognize the value of those unconfutable experiences even for the 
profane? It would have been a loyalty to them, a passion for the truth, that is to 
say, the reality they could not invent from day to day. They should have adhered 
to what Pasteur proposed, even though he upset and defeated all they had been 
teaching and proposing for years; in the end, they were not faithful to the scien-
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tific method which they even rightly asserted in theory, they were not really true 
scientists in that prejudice prevailed in them. 
We are therefore led by experiential analysis to admit that the heart of the 
human knowledge problem is not in a particular intelligence capacity. The more 
a value is vital and elementary in its importance to the concrete person, the more 
nature gives everyone the intelligence enough to know and judge. The center of 
the problem is really the right position of the subject in front of reality in its en-
tirety. 
What is the right position of the human subject in reality? You should want to 
know what the object of knowledge really is, have an interest in the object for 
what it really is. It seems trivial, but in fact we too easily are interested in retain-
ing and backing the opinions we already have on the subject. In the field of 
knowledge, the fundamental factor is to love the truth of the object more than to 
remain attached to the opinions we already have about it. We need to love the 
truth more than ourselves. The heart of the human cognitive problem is there-
fore the ultimate loyalty of the subject to reality. 
Freedom, therefore, does not only intervene in the coherence of the imple-
mentation of what reason has recognized and judged, it is not a purely moral 
energy of the implementation of a project conceived without any interference; it 
intervenes decisively in the cognitive process, determines that ultimate funda-
mental attitude with which the human subject faces the circumstance in which 
he lives. This last attitude can be traced back to a single alternative: to be open to 
the whole of reality, with the eyes gnawed as a child, honestly, recognizing things 
for what they are, or standing in front of reality defending ourselves, calling the 
reality of the court’s own opinion, imposing upon reality our own mental pat-
tern, ultimately determined by the cultural and social pressure of the situation in 
which we live. 
Finally, let us point out that only one of the two positions is appropriate to re-
ality: every person involved in some scientific research knows that in the face of 
a set of data offered by a given experiment one can never eliminate those that 
appear contradictory with most measurements or that seem to contradict the 
scientific hypothesis on which the experiment was conceived and built. You 
must have the patience to resume all the details of the experiment, look for ran-
dom or systematic errors, repeat the experiment several times. So sometimes the 
discovery that comes up is more important than the scientific hypothesis from 
which it started. In any other case, the results that are reported are likely to turn 
us away from the truth and help to increase the general confusion, to distance 
ourselves from the resolution of the problem. 
8. Conclusion 
Summarizing, we started from the common experience of a sphere of freedom, 
even if limited, in our action and from a perception of the singularity of our 
person; circumstance these that are denied by some trends of Neuro-Scientists, 
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according to whom the existence itself of a free will would be a pure illusion and 
our subjectivity an epiphenomenon of cerebral processes which could be fully 
explained in physical terms. We agree that all of our actions, our thoughts, our 
sensations, our states of consciousness and unconsciousness, can be correlated to 
the structure of our central nervous system, to the processes that occur in it and 
the algorithm by which it proceeds. These are certainly necessary conditions for 
consciousness but cannot be sufficient. We have observed that a description ac-
cording the physical laws of the cerebral processes turns out to be incommen-
surable with our subjective perceptions. No description of the cerebral processes 
related to the vision will ever be of any use to communicate to a color blind the 
idea of the colors that he cannot perceive. In particular, no analysis of the cere-
bral processes in themselves can enable us to foresee when consciousness ap-
pears and to put them in relation with our subjective experiences; to do this, as 
Libet observed, questioning the individual is essential. 
We have observed that, for a constitutive methodologic choice Physics has not 
even the language to state problems such as the problem of consciousness and 
particularly of consciousness of our personal identity. The language of Physics in 
itself, to be established, requires the natural language, which is based on our 
primary, personal experiences, which are in themselves incommunicable, are a 
necessary premise to the physical concepts and therefore cannot be explained in 
its context. The materialistic claim of reducing our subjectivity to purely physical 
fact brings to insuperable aporias, which cannot be overcome and actually is 
equivalent to completely ignoring an extremely important part of our expe-
rience. The points of view both of external and internal sense are necessarily 
complementary and rationally one cannot disregard the one rather than the oth-
er one. 
As concerns more specifically the problem of free will and the claim of its 
denial since incompatible with physical determinism, we observed first that 
modern Physics is not deterministic and that, in any way, the moment we recog-
nize that subjectivity cannot be reduced to Physics, we must even accept that it 
conforms to laws that transcend Physics. Then, we have also observed that the 
essentially quantum nature of the laws regulating the behavior of the single 
neurons very likely has to emerge at the macroscopic level, due to the complexity 
itself of our brain, which makes it extremely sensitive to fluctuations in the ini-
tial conditions. It seems plausible that, if we were able to calculate the reaction of 
our brain to external stimuli, given a certain internal state, we would find many 
possible responses with different specific probabilities. We have seen that just 
this fact could help better understand the relation between a description of our 
cerebral processes according to Physics and our subjective perceptions; that what 
appears casual from the point of view of Physics turns out to be intentional from 
the point of view of introspection. We have also tried to show, that the results of 
experiments like those performed by Libet, not only are not in contrast with the 
existence of a free will, as somebody would imply, but, on the contrary, it would 
be incomprehensible without it. 
 
DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.83023 339 Open Journal of Philosophy 
 
M. Ceroni, G. M. Prosperi 
 
Free will is such an essential trait of the human subject that is implicated and 
determinant in the process of knowledge. Also it is essential for the scientific 
knowledge as we all know in the field of scientific papers and their loyalty to data. 
In conclusion the perception that we have of a freedom to act is deeply inborn 
in our entire life. As we said, it is implied in the assumption of any behavior co-
dex, in judgments that at any time we express, in any reference to justice. Who 
wants to deny this freedom, is inescapably forced to live a break between a pure-
ly theoretical abstract statement and an attitude in practical life which cannot be 
avoided. He is essentially forced toward something like a double truth doctrine. 
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